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Abstract
■ Most studies of conceptual knowledge in the brain focus
on a narrow range of concrete conceptual categories, rely on
the researchersʼ intuitions about which object belongs to these
categories, and assume a broadly taxonomic organization
of knowledge. In this fMRI study, we focus on concepts with
a variety of concreteness levels; we use a state of the art lexical
resource (WordNet 3.1) as the source for a relatively large
number of category distinctions and compare a taxonomic style
of organization with a domain-based model (an example domain
is Law). Participants mentally simulated situations associated
with concepts when cued by text stimuli. Using multivariate
pattern analysis, we find evidence that all Taxonomic categories
and Domains can be distinguished from fMRI data and also
observe a clear concreteness effect: Tools and Locations can
be reliably predicted for unseen participants, but less concrete
categories (e.g., Attributes, Communications, Events, Social
Roles) can only be reliably discriminated within participants.
A second concreteness effect relates to the interaction of
Domain and Taxonomic category membership: Domain (e.g.,
relation to Law vs. Music) can be better predicted for less
concrete categories. We repeated the analysis within ana-
tomical regions, observing discrimination between all/most
categories in the left mid occipital and left mid temporal gyri,
and more specialized discrimination for concrete categories
Tool and Location in the left precentral and fusiform gyri, re-
spectively. Highly concrete/abstract Taxonomic categories and
Domain were segregated in frontal regions. We conclude that
both Taxonomic and Domain class distinctions are relevant
for interpreting neural structuring of concrete and abstract
concepts. ■
INTRODUCTION
Data about the organization of conceptual knowledge
in the brain coming from patients with semantic deficits
(Mahon & Caramazza, 2011; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers,
2007; Damasio, Tranel, Grabowski, Adolphs, & Damasio,
2004; Vinson, Vigliocco, Cappa, & Siri, 2003; Caramazza
& Shelton, 1998; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) or collected
from healthy patients using fMRI (Malach, Levy, & Hasson,
2002; Martin & Chao, 2001; Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin,
Schouten, & Haxby, 1999) have proven an essential source
of evidence for our understanding of conceptual represen-
tations, particularly when analyzed using machine learn-
ing methods (e.g., Connolly et al., 2012; Chang, Mitchell,
& Just, 2010; Just, Cherkassky, Aryal, & Mitchell, 2010;
Hanson&Halchenko, 2008; Kriegeskorte, Mur, & Bandettini,
2008; Kriegeskorte, Mur, Ruff, et al., 2008; Mitchell
et al., 2008; Shinkareva, Mason, Malave, Wang, & Mitchell,
2008; Kamitani & Tong, 2005; OʼToole, Jiang, Abdi, &
Haxby, 2005; Hanson, Matsuka, & Haxby, 2004; Haxby
et al., 2001). Most of this work, however, has focused
on a narrow range of conceptual categories, primarily
concrete concepts such as animals, plants, tools, etc. (i.e.,
only a small percentage of the range of conceptual categories
that form human knowledge). Although there is a substantial
body of work investigating the representation of verbs and
actions (e.g., Papeo, Rumiati, Cecchetto, & Tomasino, 2012;
Peelen, Romagno, & Caramazza, 2012; Tomasino, Ceschia,
Fabbro, & Skrap, 2012), until recently only a few studies
went beyond concrete concepts to study the representation
in the brain of concepts such as law or freedom (Wilson-
Mendenhall, Kyle Simmons, Martin, & Barsalou, 2013;
Kranjec, Cardillo, Schmidt, Lehet, & Chatterjee, 2012;
Quadflieg et al., 2011; Binder, Westbury, McKiernan,
Possing, & Medler, 2005; Friederici, Steinhauer, & Pfeifer,
2002; Grossman et al., 2002; Jessen et al., 2000). Interest
has grown recently; for example, some studies have shown
that fMRI data contain sufficient information to discriminate
between concrete and nonconcrete concepts (Vigliocco
et al., 2013; Wang, Baucom, & Shinkareva, 2012; Binder,
Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; Binder et al., 2005). How-
ever, meta-analyses such as Wang, Conder, Blitzer, and
Shinkareva (2010) and also Wilson-Mendenhall et al.
(2013) showed that fairly different results are obtained
depending on the types of nonconcrete concepts under
study and that the range of nonconcrete concepts con-
sidered remains fairly narrow. The first objective of the
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present work is therefore to broaden the range of non-
concrete concepts under study and to analyze more
carefully the effect of concept category.
This type of analysis is however complicated by the fact
that the representation and organization of human
knowledge about nonconcrete conceptual categories is
much less understood than in the case of concrete con-
cepts. Human intuitions about nonconcrete concepts are
not very sharp, for example, studies asking participants
to specify the defining characteristics of nonconcrete con-
cepts find that this task is much harder than for concrete
ones (Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 2005; McRae & Cree, 2002;
Hampton, 1981). On the theoretical side, as well, there is
not much agreement on nonconcrete concepts among
psychologists, (computational) linguists, philosophers,
and other cognitive scientists who proposed theories
about the organization of conceptual knowledge. Just
about the only point of agreement among such proposals
is the need to go beyond the dichotomy “concrete con-
cept”/“abstract concept”: human conceptual knowledge
includes a great variety of nonconcrete categories of vary-
ing degrees of nonconcreteness ranging from knowledge
about space and time (e.g., day, country) to knowledge
about actions and events (e.g., concert, robbery), to knowl-
edge about inner states including emotions ( fear) and
cognitive states (belief ), to purely abstract concepts (e.g.,
art, jazz, law). It is also known that many of these cate-
gories have their own distinct representation in memory
(Binder & Desai, 2011). (These considerations also chal-
lenge the notion that concreteness is a matter of degree,
an issue that is very relevant to this study—see also Connell
& Lynott, 2012.) But there is a lot of disagreement among
exactly which categories these different types of non-
concrete concepts belong to (e.g., which category does
the concept law belong to). These disagreements are
reflected by the major differences one can find in the
way nonconcrete conceptual knowledge is organized in
the large-scale repositories of conceptual knowledge that
have appeared in the last 20 years, such as WordNet
(Fellbaum, 1998), CYC (Lenat & Guha, 1990), and DOLCE
(Gangemi et al., 2002). For instance, in WordNet, the top
category “abstract concept” covers attributes, events and
actions, temporal entities, and highly abstract concepts
such as “law” both in the sense of “collection of all laws”
and in the sense of “area of study,” whereas locations
are considered concrete concepts. In DOLCE, actions
and events, attributes, and highly abstract concepts such
as propositions are treated as completely unrelated con-
ceptual categories, whereas both temporal and spatial
locations are included in the quality category.
More fundamental objections have also been raised.
Some researchers have questioned whether the traditional
distinction among categories each representing objects
of different types, originally developed for concrete con-
cepts, is applicable to nonconcrete ones as well. Gentner
(1981), Hampton (1981), and others found that, unlike
concrete concepts, nonconcrete concepts are mostly
characterized in terms of relations to other entities present
in a situation. Wiemer-Hastings and Xu (2005) provided
further support for this finding and proposed that abstract
concepts are “anchored in situations” (Wiemer-Hastings
& Xu, 2005, p. 731); in a similar fashion, Barsalou (1999)
argued that the representation of abstract concepts is
“framed by abstract event sequences.” This suggests what
we will call here a scenario-based organization for non-
concrete concepts. In this type of organization, non-
concrete concepts are not organized in memory by virtue
of their similarity with other concepts of the same “type”
(e.g., court and theater are types of location, and judge
and musician are types of social role) but in terms of the
scenarios in which they play a role. For instance, according
to these theories, the conceptual representation of justice
would not be determined by the fact that it belongs to
the same type as other nonconcrete concepts, whatever
that type may be, but by the fact that it plays a key role
in law scenarios, and it is related to other concepts and
entities in those scenarios (along with lawyers, court
rooms, evidence and verdicts, etc). Or to make another
example, the conceptual representation of jazz would be
determined by its relations to other concepts such as
saxophones, guitarists, and songs inMusic scenarios. Thus,
a second key objective of this study was to compare two
types of organization for nonconcrete concepts:
• The traditional taxonomic organization: As we are going
beyond the repertoire of “uncontroversial” concepts
commonly studied in cognitive work on concepts, we
could not simply rely on our intuitions concerning their
categorization; instead, we followed the distinctions
made in the WordNet lexical database (Fellbaum,
1998), release 3.1, at present the largest-scale and most
widely used repository of conceptual knowledge.
• A scenario-based organization: Unfortunately, there is
no lexical database specifying the scenarios concepts
belong to. There is, however, a resource called WordNet
Domain (Bentivogli, Forner, Magnini, & Pianta, 2004)
that specifies the domains a concept belongs to, e.g.,
that concept judge belongs to the Law domain, whereas
concept clarinet belongs to the Music domain. In
this first study, we used domains as an approximation
of scenarios; we will therefore call the organization we
compared to taxonomic organization “domain-based
organization.”
To summarize, four fundamental questions about the
organization of nonconcrete concepts in the mind were
addressed in this study: (1) Can taxonomic distinctions
and domain distinctions be distinguished from the fMRI
data for concrete and nonconcrete concepts? (2) Is there
a difference in classification accuracy between taxonomic
organization and domain-based organization? (3) Are
there commonalities in taxonomic/domain represen-
tation across participants? (4) How do taxonomic and
domain distinctions interact?
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These questions were targeted using a standard multi-
variate pattern analysis procedure, where a classifier is
trained to predict the class membership of unseen fMRI
data. We used as stimuli concepts belonging to seven
distinct taxonomic categories defined in WordNet, rang-
ing from concrete categories (Tool ) to more abstract
ones (Location, Social Role, Event, Communication,
Attribute, and a category we called Urabstract of highly
abstract words; see Materials section) and to two differ-
ent domains in WordNet Domain (Music and Law).
The stimuli were presented in the form of words on
the screen. The experiment aimed to activate conceptual
representations, so participants were asked to mentally
simulate situations that exemplified each stimulus while
their brain activity was recorded using fMRI. Multivariate
pattern analysis was then used to determine if single
stimulus trials could be classified according to their
taxonomic category and domain, both within single ses-
sions and across participants. In addition to testing
whether nonconcrete concepts of various types could be
discriminated using the same types of analysis successfully
used with concrete concepts, we aimed to compare the
relative ease of decoding taxonomic category versus
domain, and so to determine which of these two types
of organization is more central to the definition of non-
concrete concepts.
METHODS
Materials
We aimed to use as stimuli a list of words representative
of the full range of nonconcrete concepts and also clearly
associated with the two domains Music and Law. To
identify the taxonomic categories, we started from the
concreteness norms collected by Barca, Burani, and
Arduino (2002). We selected the words with the lowest
concreteness value. We then looked up these words in
the Italian version of WordNet, MultiWordNet (Pianta,
Bentivogli, & Girardi, 2002), to determine the taxonomic
category of their dominant sense. In this way, we iden-
tified the six WordNet categories most commonly found
with the “most abstract” words in the Barca et al. norms.
These six categories are as follows:
• Location, defined in WordNet as “points or extents in
space,” and including concepts such as court, jail,
and theatre. Location is considered as concrete objects
in WordNet but belongs to a separate category of
“qualities” in DOLCE and could therefore be considered
concepts in between concrete and abstract.
• Four nonconcrete categories of arguably increasing
levels of abstractness (see also Discussion section):
Event/action (“something that happens at a given place
and time”), Communication (“something that is com-
municated by or to or between groups,” covering con-
cepts such as accusation, letter, and symphony),
Attribute (“a construct whereby objects or individuals
can be distinguished”), and Urabstract (our own term
for concepts such as law or jazz, which are classified
as abstract in WordNet but do not belong to a clear
subcategory of abstract such as Event or Attribute).
• Finally, the WordNet category person, individual,
someone, somebody, mortal, a great many of whose
hyponyms are what we may call social roles such as
judge or tenor. Social roles occur frequently among
the least concrete concepts in concreteness norms
such as Barca et al.ʼs, which is a good reason to include
them in this study, although it is not very clear whether
they should be considered concrete or nonconcrete—
and indeed, in so-called “generative” theories of the
lexicon such as Pustejovskyʼs (1995), they are consid-
ered hybrids (the term used is dot objects). A second
reason is their strong association with scenarios and
also with domains, which makes their classification
very relevant for this study.
In addition, one category of concrete concepts was
selected: Tool.
As the original words from the Barca norm could not
be used as they were for the most part highly ambiguous,
the next step was to select 70 words whose unique or
most preferred sense belonged to one of these seven
categories and that were also representative of the two
chosen domains: Music and Law. This was done using
WordNet Domains (Bentivogli et al., 2004), a publically
available resource in which every concept in WordNet
is annotated with its domain. Lists of candidate words
for each domain/taxonomy combination were obtained;
from these lists, we eliminated all those words that were
either too infrequent or polysemous with senses be-
longing to different categories. The result was a list of
70 stimuli, 10 stimuli per taxonomic category, of which
5 were classified in WordNet Domains as belonging to
the Music domain, whereas 5 belonged to the Law
domain. The full set of words is listed in Table 1.
Tests for Perceptual Confounds
To examine whether there were any perceptual differ-
ences between categories of stimulus words, we tested
for differences between number of letters, number of
phonemes, and number of syllables using two-way ANOVA.
For the number of letters, we found no significant dif-
ference for Domain, F(1, 56) = 2.09, p = .15, a significant
difference between Taxonomic Category, F(6, 56) = 2.05,
p = .03, and no significant interaction between Domain ×
Taxonomic category, F(1, 56) = 1.8, p = .12. Post hoc
t tests found only Attribute and Urabstract to be sig-
nificantly different: Urabstracts have significantly fewer
letters than Attribute (t = −2.645, df = 18, p = .03). For
number of phonemes there were no significant differ-
ences between domains, F(1, 56) = 2.25, p = .139, be-
tween Taxonomic categories, F(6, 56) = 2.08, p = .07,
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and interaction, F(6, 56) = 1.55, p = .18. Number of syl-
lables did not differ between Domains, F(1, 56) = 3.92,
p > .05, but did differ between Taxonomic categories,
F(6, 56) = 4.33, p = .0012. Interaction was not significant,
F(6, 56) = 1.63, p = .155. Post hoc comparisons using the
Tukey HSD test revealed that Urabstracts differed from
Attribute, Communication, Location, and Social Role by
having fewer syllables. There were no other significant
differences.
Word Norming
Norming ratings for the 70 stimulus words were collected
following the procedure proposed by Barca et al. (2002)
from 24 Italian native speakers (12 men, mean age =
28.8 years, SD = 5.2 years). No significant differences be-
tween Domain and Taxonomic Category and no signifi-
cant interaction were found for Familiarity (Domain:
F(6, 56)= 2.23 by a two-way ANOVA, p< .1407; Taxonomic
Category: F(6, 56)= 1.81, p< .1127; Domain×Taxonomic
Category: F(6, 56) = 0.87, p = .5211). The 70 words were
generally rated as familiar. Following Barca et al., Con-
creteness was rated on a scale of 1 as highly abstract to
7 as highly concrete. Figure 1 plots histograms of partici-
pantsʼ concreteness ratings per word, and Figure 2 plots
the associated means and standard deviations for each
stimulus word. In Figure 2, an increase in the spread of
the histograms as the expected concreteness of the cate-
gory decreases is clear. Tools and, to a slightly lesser extent,
Locations were consistently rated as concrete, whereas
ratings for the remaining five taxonomic categories became
increasingly inconsistent; 20 words in these categories
were rated as both highly concrete (7) and highly abstract
(1). From Figure 2, it can be seen that mean ratings of
Social Roles were consistently toward the concrete end
of the scale; however, the considerable variability within
the categories Event, Communication, Attribute, and
Urabstract is clear. There was also a divide within these
four categories between Music words and Law words:
Music words tended to be rated as more concrete.
Table 1. Italian Stimulus Words and English Translations,
Divided into Domains (Columns) and Taxonomic Categories
(Groups of Five Rows)
Law Music
Attribute
giurisdizione jurisdiction sonoritaʼ sonority
cittadinanza citizenship ritmo rhythm
impunitaʼ impunity melodia melody
legalitaʼ legality tonalitaʼ tonality
illegalitaʼ illegality intonazione pitch
Communication
divieto prohibition canzone song
verdetto verdict pentagramma stave
ordinanza decree ballata ballad
addebito accusation ritornello refrain
ingiunzione injunction sinfonia symphony
Event
arresto arrest concerto concert
processo trial recital recital
reato crime assolo solo
furto theft festival festival
assoluzione acquittal spettacolo show
Social Role
giudice judge musicista musician
ladro thief cantante singer
imputato defendant compositore composer
testimone witness chitarrista guitarist
avvocato lawyer tenore tenor
Tool
manette handcuffs violino violin
toga robe tamburo drum
manganello truncheon tromba trumpet
cappio noose metronomo metronome
grimaldello skeleton key radio radio
Location
tribunale court/tribunal palco stage
carcere prison auditorium auditorium
questura police station discoteca disco
Table 1. (continued )
Law Music
penitenziario penitentiary conservatorio conservatory
patibolo gallows teatro theater
Urabstracts
giustizia justice musica music
libertaʼ liberty blues blues
legge law jazz jazz
corruzione corruption canto singing
refurtiva loot punk punk
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A two-way ANOVA found significant differences between
Domains, F(1, 56)= 35.15,p< .001; Taxonomic categories,
F(6, 56) = 65.01, p < .001; and a significant interaction
between Domain and Taxonomic category, F(6, 56) =
4.36, p = .001. Table 2 displays the results of post hoc in-
dependent t tests between each of the 21 unique com-
binations of taxonomic pairs when measured on the
7-point scale. Tool, Location, and Social Role are all highly
significantly different ( p < .001) from each other and the
other categories (Tool is more concrete than Location,
which is more concrete than Social Role). Except for
between Attribute and Event, combinations of Attribute,
Event, Communication, Urabstract do not differ sig-
nificantly in concreteness.
This raises two issues. First, the implications of the in-
consistent ratings, which are reminiscent of the difficulties
of getting participants to agree on the characteristic
features of nonconcrete concepts (Wiemer-Hastings &
Xu, 2005). We take this to be strong evidence that con-
cepts are not organized in a “concreteness scale”: humans
can tell that, say, a Tool is more concrete than an Attribute,
but have no clear intuition as to whether an Attribute like
“sonority” is more or less concrete than another Attribute
or a Communication concept such as “accusation.” This
introduces a question of whether it is indeed appropriate
to measure concreteness on such a scale, and in light of
this, we consider a simple alternative: to binarize the Likert
scale to concrete = 1 and abstract = 0. We realize this by
dividing the concreteness ratings according to a cutoff of 5
and below as abstract based on observations of Figure 2.
As can be seen from the resulting histograms in Figure 3,
this reduces ambiguity for Communication, Attribute,
and Urabstracts, which are predominantly abstract; Tool,
Location are consistently concrete; however, Social Role
and Event remain ambiguous. Either way, there is some
variability in the concreteness of concepts within some
Figure 1. Per word histograms of concreteness ratings (24 participants, 7-point scale, 1 = highly abstract, 7 = highly concrete).
Figure 2. Per word mean
and standard deviation
concreteness ratings
(24 participants, 1 = highly
abstract, 7 = highly concrete).
Circles are Law-related
words, and Crosses are
Music-related words.
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categories. Given that the categories were selected on the
basis of containing nonconcrete concepts and peoplesʼ
experience and estimations naturally differ (apparently
widely), we consider this an inevitable consequence of such
an experimental design. Therefore, to summarize, our
investigation was of the neural relevance of taxonomic/
domain categories, with our nonconcrete categories popu-
lated by concepts considered on average to be noncon-
crete, and with our subsequent cross-validation analyses
targeting category discrimination.
Second, the significant difference between domains,
which is a nuisance for the interpretation of our classifi-
cation results, in that domain meaning and concreteness
are apparently confounded (if meaning and concreteness
can indeed be considered to be separable; also discussed
in Discussion section). We address this in Can taxonomic
Figure 3. Per word histograms
of binarized concreteness
ratings (24 participants,
1 = concrete, 0 = abstract).
Table 2. Results of Independent t Tests (Two-Tailed, df = 18) Testing for Differences in Concreteness Ratings (Scale [1 7])
between Each of the 21 Taxonomic Category Pairs
Tool Location Social Role Event Communication Attribute
Tool
Location t = 4.2, p < .001
Social Role t = 9.6, p < .001 t = 5.7, p < .001
Event t = 14.8, p < .001 t = 11.1, p < .001 t = 5.7, p < .001
Communication t= 9.4, p < .001 t = 7.7, p < .001 t = 4.5, p < .001 t = 0.7, p = .5
Attribute t = 29.7, p < .001 t = 20.3, p < .001 t = 11, p < .001 t = 3.2, p = .005 t = 1.3, p = .21
Urabstract t = 16.0, p < .001 t = 12.3, p < .001 t = 6.8, p < .001 t = 1.2, p = .24 t = 0.2, p = .86 t = −1.7, p = .1
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category-based and domain-based distinctions be recog-
nized within participants? section by regressing out con-
creteness trends (as described either with the binary or
Likert scale, which we consider dubious). In Which is
more strongly encoded, taxonomic category distinctions
or domain distinctions? section, where we have many
taxonomic category pairs to choose from, we identify
categories balanced in concreteness.
Participants
Seven right-handed native Italian speakers aged between
19 and 38 years (three women) were recruited to take
part in the study. All had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Participants received compensation of A15 per
hour. The studies were conducted under the approval of
the ethics committee at the University of Trento, and
participants gave informed consent.
Data Acquisition
fMRI images were recorded on a 4T Bruker MedSpec
MRI scanner at the neuroimaging (LNiF) labs of the Cen-
tre for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento. An EPI
pulse sequence with repetition time = 1000 msec, echo
time = 33 msec, and 26° flip angle was used. A 64 ×
64 acquisition matrix was used, and 17 slices were imaged
with a between slice gap of 1 mm. Voxels had dimensions
of 3 mm × 3 mm × 5 mm.
Experimental Paradigm
The names of the 70 concepts were presented to partici-
pants in the form of written words on the screen. Stimuli
were displayed using bold Arial-Black size 20 font on a
gray background. Each stimulus was presented five times,
for a total of 350 trials, split in five blocks with the order
of presentation being randomized in each block. Partici-
pants had the opportunity to pause between blocks, and
the overall task time did not exceed 60 min. Each trial
began with the presentation of a blank screen for 0.5 sec,
followed by the stimulus word of dark gray on a light
gray background for 3 sec, and a fixation cross for 6.5 sec.
Participants were asked to keep still during the task and
during breaks.
In experiments studying concrete concepts, the task of
participants is often to think actively about the properties
of the object named (see, e.g., Mitchell et al., 2008). How-
ever, eliciting properties has been found difficult with
nonconcrete concepts (Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 2005). On
the other hand, participants to studies such as Wiemer-
Hastings and Xu (2005) and Hampton (1981) appeared
able to think of situations in which these concepts played
a role and to produce situation-related objects. Our par-
ticipants were therefore instructed to “think about situa-
tions that exemplify the concept the word refers to.” The
list of concept words was supplied to participants in
advance of the experiment, so that they could prepare
appropriate situations to simulate consistently.
Preprocessing
Preprocessing was undertaken using the Statistical Para-
metric Mapping software (SPM99, Wellcome Department
of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). The data were cor-
rected for head motion, unwarped (to compensate for
geometric distortions in the image interacting with motion),
and spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological
Institute template image and resampled at 3 mm × 3 mm ×
6mm.Only voxels estimated to be graymatterwere included
in the subsequent analysis. For each participant, the data,
per voxel, in each session (presentation cycle of 70 words)
were corrected for linear trend and transformed to z scores.
A single volume was computed to represent each stim-
ulus word by taking the voxel-wise mean of the 4 sec of
data offset by 4 sec from the stimulus onset (to account
for hemodynamic response).
Cross-validation Analysis Procedure
Broadly the same cross-validation procedure was fol-
lowed for each of the analyses targeting the fundamental
questions in the introduction. Specifics on variations in
the procedure are indicated where relevant in the results.
Input and target data pairs were partitioned into train-
ing and testing sets (using a leave-n-out approach) to
support a number of cross-validation iterations. Target
patterns were binary vectors with a single field set to one
to uniquely specify the category (e.g., Law = [1 0] and
Music = [0 1]). Input was a masked version of the fMRI
gray matter data, retaining the 1000 most stable voxels
in the training set according to the following procedure,
similar to that used by Mitchell et al. (2008). For each voxel,
the set of 70 words from each unique pair of scanning
sessions in the training set were correlated, and the mean
of the six resulting correlations (from the four scanning
sessions used in training) was taken as the measure of
stability. The 1000 voxels with highest mean correlations
were selected for analysis.
Pattern classification used a single layer neural network
with logistic activation functions (MATLAB 2009B, Math-
works, Neural Network toolbox). Weights and biases were
initialized using the Nguyen-Widrow algorithm and train-
ing used conjugate gradient decent, continued until con-
vergence, with performance evaluated using mean square
error, with a goal of 10−4 or completion of 2000 training
epochs. In each cross-validation iteration, the network
was trained using the masked fMRI data and binary tar-
get codes in the training set and subsequently tested on
the previously unseen masked fMRI data. The Euclidean
distance between the network output vectors and tar-
get codes was computed, and the target code with the
minimum distance was selected as the network output.
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Our taxonomic category discrimination is a seven-
way classification task, and until recently, the available
methods for testing significance in the case of multiclass
problems were not entirely satisfactory. Binomial tests
are often used to test whether a classifier is predicting
randomly (which is most informative when there are
two-classes), but their application is severely limited in
the multiclass case, because they do not tell us whether
the classifier is capable of distinguishing between all test
categories or just between subsets of categories. Motivated
by these concerns and drawing from the statistical litera-
ture on contingency tables, Olivetti, Greiner, and Avesani
(2012) developed a test in which Bayesian hypothesis
testing techniques are used to estimate the posterior
probability of each possible partitioning of distinguishable
subsets of test classes in a multiclass problem. Consider
for instance a problem in which items in the test set be-
long to the three classes: Classes 1, 2, and 3. There are
five possible partitions. The classifier may be able to dis-
tinguish all three classes ([1][2][3]). Alternatively, the clas-
sifier may only be able of partial discrimination, as in the
partitions [1,2][3] (i.e., the classifier is unable to discrimi-
nate between Classes 1 and 2, but can discriminate either
1 or 2 from 3), [1,3][2] (it is unable to distinguish between
Classes 1 and 3), and [1][2,3]. Finally, the classifier may be
unable to discriminate between any of the classes [1,2,3].
Olivetti et al.ʼs method assigns a posterior probability
to each of these partitions, which can then be used to de-
cide which of the interpretations of the confusion matrix
are most likely, where, as a rule of thumb, a probability
in excess of 1/K, where K is the number of hypotheses
(i.e., K = 5 in the three-class example just discussed),
would be seen as informative evidence. We interpret our
discrimination results using Olivetti et al.ʼs technique and
Binomial tests.
RESULTS
Can Taxonomic Category-based and Domain-based
Distinctions Be Recognized within Participants?
Leave-session-out cross-validation analyses were under-
taken for each participant to recognize taxonomic and
domain distinctions from the fMRI data. There were five
scanning sessions; therefore, training in each of the five
cross-validation iterations was on 280 volumes (four repli-
cates of each of the 70 stimulus words) and testing was on
the remaining 70 words. In each iteration, the 1000 most
stable voxels were selected (see Cross validation analy-
sis procedure section), and to give an impression of the
spread of their locations across the cortex, all voxels that
contributed to at least two of the five cross-validation itera-
tions were identified per participant. Each voxel was linked
to its anatomical region according to the automated label-
ing of Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. (2002), and a count was made
of the number of voxels belonging to each unique region
contributing to the analysis. The union of all anatomical
regions across participants was taken, and voxel counts
per region per participant were summed. The break-
down of number of voxels per anatomical region across
participants is in Table 3. A discussion of the possible func-
tional contribution of the different regions is in Discussion
section. Figures 4 and 5 show confusion matrices averaging
results across all seven participants (and cross-validation
iterations within participant) for taxonomic category and
domain, respectively. Both confusionmatrices have an over-
lay that separates the taxonomic predictions by Music and
Law components and domain predictions by taxonomic
components.
Can Taxonomic Distinctions Be Recognized
within Participants?
Mean classification accuracy for the seven-way taxonomic
distinctions was ∼.3, with chance level at .143. Accuracy
was greatest for Location, Tool, and Attribute, and there
is a visible diagonal in Figure 4, suggesting all classes can
be discriminated. Overall 730/2450 correct classifications
were observed, and the probability of achieving this by
chance is p= 2.2× 10−16 (two-tailed Binomial test). Apply-
ing Olivetti et al.ʼs (2012) test to the taxonomic confu-
sion matrix in Figure 4 and sorting all subset partitions
in descending order of posterior probability, we find
that easily the top ranking partition hypothesis (posterior
probability = 0.93) is the one according to which all seven
test classes can be discriminated. The highest-ranked
three partitions are shown in the caption of Figure 4.
(The posterior probabilities rapidly diminish in the re-
maining 874 partitions that are not displayed; however,
any posterior probability >1/877 = 0.0011 is regarded as
informative. The full list is in the supplementary materials
for Figure 4.) Tool, Location, and Attributes are most
clearly distinguished, whereas prediction of taxonomic
category is weakest for medium-ranked categories on the
concreteness scale (Event and Communication). Indeed
in the second partition of Olivetti et al.ʼs (2012) analysis,
these categories aggregate.
Can Domains Be Predicted within Participants?
Mean classification accuracy over participants and cross-
validation iterations for the two-way domain distinc-
tion was ∼.7, with chance level at .5. In total there were
1702/2450 correct classifications, and the probability of
achieving this by chance is p = 2.2 × 10−16 (two-tailed
Binomial test). The results with Olivetti et al.ʼs (2012)
statistics, presented in detail in the caption of Figure 5,
strongly suggest that Law and Music can be discriminated
(posterior probability > .99). Domains are relatively
weakly discriminated for Location words; the accuracy
for Law/Tool is also comparatively low. These differences
between classification strength for the Domain distinction
for different Taxonomic categories are further discussed
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in Which is more strongly encoded, taxonomic category
distinctions or domain distinctions? section.
To counteract the possible effects of differences in
concreteness ratings between Domains (see Materials
section), the above analysis was repeated after regressing
out the concreteness trend from the fMRI data. Specifi-
cally for each participant, linear regression was used to
estimate the relationship between the mean concrete-
ness score per word and fMRI data for each voxel. This
was repeated using mean scores derived from the binar-
ization of the 7-point Likert scale discussed in Materials
section and the Likert scale. The regression line was sub-
sequently subtracted from the data, and the classification
analysis was repeated. In the binary case, overall classifica-
tion accuracy summed over participants was reduced from
.69 to .62 (1527/2450 correct classifications, where p =
2.2 × 10−16 for a two-tailed Binomial test, and Olivetti
et al.ʼs, 2012 posterior probability that classes can be dis-
tinguished is >.99, as opposed to p = 6.67 × 10−32 for
the hypothesis that classes are indistinguishable). With
the Likert scale, although results were still statistically
significant, overall classification accuracy was substantially
reduced from .69 to .575 (1408/2450 correct classifica-
tions, where p = 1.495 × 10−13 for a two-tailed Binomial
test, and Olivetti et al.ʼs, 2012 posterior probability that
classes can be distinguished is >.99, as opposed to p =
3.60 × 10−11 for the hypothesis that classes are in-
distinguishable). The reduction in accuracy is not sur-
prising given the generally lower concreteness ratings for
Law words. However, given the inconsistencies observed
between participantsʼ concreteness ratings, the trend
removed from neural data may have been inappropriate
(i.e., for some participants, the detrending may have
removed signal associated with domain rather than
concreteness).
Which Is More Strongly Encoded, Taxonomic
Category Distinctions or Domain Distinctions?
Having established that both taxonomic categories and
domains can be distinguished within participants, we
may go on to question whether there are differences
in the strength with which taxonomic category and do-
main are encoded within the words. In addition, we can
explore whether such a difference (if any) bears any rela-
tionship to the degree of concreteness of the words (e.g.,
in Figure 5, Domain is relatively weakly predicted for
Location).
As there are only two domains and seven taxonomic
categories (and therefore a mismatch in the amount of re-
spective training data available for each), the experimental
design was balanced by selecting all unique taxonomic
category pairs (e.g., Attribute vs. Communication, Attrib-
ute vs. Event, etc., giving 21 pairs of 10 words each in total)
and running two classification analyses, first, distinguish-
ing between domains and, second, between taxonomic
categories on each of the 21 data sets. The 21 data sets
Table 3. Breakdown of the Number of Stable Voxels
by Anatomical Region Contributing to Analysis in Can
Taxonomic Category-based and Domain-based Distinctions
Be Recognized within Participants? Section, Summed
over Participants
Proportion Cumulative
Temporal_Mid_L 0.05 0.05
Precuneus_L 0.04 0.09
Occipital_Mid_L 0.04 0.13
Precuneus_R 0.04 0.17
Parietal_Inf_L 0.04 0.21
Temporal_Mid_R 0.03 0.24
Frontal_Mid_L 0.03 0.27
Precentral_L 0.02 0.29
Calcarine_R 0.02 0.32
Frontal_Mid_R 0.02 0.34
Parietal_Sup_L 0.02 0.36
Angular_L 0.02 0.39
Postcentral_L 0.02 0.41
Calcarine_L 0.02 0.43
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 0.02 0.45
Frontal_Sup_L 0.02 0.47
Temporal_Sup_L 0.02 0.49
Temporal_Sup_R 0.02 0.51
Occipital_Mid_R 0.02 0.53
Angular_R 0.02 0.55
Cingulum_Mid_L 0.02 0.56
Frontal_Sup_R 0.02 0.58
Frontal_Inf_Tri_R 0.01 0.59
Precentral_R 0.01 0.61
Lingual_R 0.01 0.62
Supp_Motor_Area_L 0.01 0.63
SupraMarginal_L 0.01 0.65
Postcentral_R 0.01 0.66
Cuneus_L 0.01 0.67
Frontal_Inf_Oper_L 0.01 0.68
Fusiform_R 0.01 0.70
Fusiform_L 0.01 0.71
Anatomical regions are ranked in descending order, and regions con-
tributing the top 70% contribution are shown. In total, there were
7449 voxels over seven participants (the 1000 most stable voxels per
participant was taken for each cross-validation iteration).
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therefore contained 100 words: 10 words × 2 taxono-
mies × 5 replicates. Other than the reduced data set size,
each of the 42 analyses followed the same protocol as
Can taxonomic category-based and domain-based distinc-
tions be recognized within participants? section (selection
of the 1000 most stable voxels and leave-session-out cross-
validation analysis).
Confusion matrices summed over participants for each
of the 42 experiments (21 domain distinctions, 21 pairwise
category distinctions) and subsequently tested according
to Olivetti et al. (2012) can be found in the supplemen-
tary materials for Figure 6. In all analyses the strongest
posterior probability was that the taxonomic categories/
domains could be distinguished. The weakest classification
Figure 4. Leave-session-out
Taxonomic category
classification confusion
matrix. Rows are the target
labels, and columns are
predictions. Numbers overlaid
on each cell indicate the
proportion of predictions
per Law and Music, respectively
(as indicated on the right y axis)
for that row, averaging over
seven participants. The numbers
on the bottom line of each cell
are the mean and standard
deviation of predictions. Cell
shading is scaled to the range
0–0.41 (0.41 is the maximum
mean accuracy per cell
displayed). Olivetti et al.ʼs
(2012) test results [T = Tool]
[L = Location][S = Social Role]
[E=Event][C=Communication]
[A = Attribute][U = Urabstracts]:
Partition 1: [[T][L][S][E][C][A]
[U]], postP: 0.93; Partition 2:
[[T][L][S][E,C][A][U]], postP:
0.04; Partition 3: [[T][L][S][E,U]
[C][A]], postP: 0.02.
Figure 5. Leave-session-out
Domain classification confusion
matrix. Rows are the target
labels, and columns are
predictions. Numbers overlaid
on each cell indicate the
proportion of predictions
per taxonomic category (as
indicated on the right y axis)
for that row, averaging over
seven participants. The
numbers on the bottom line
of each cell are the mean and
standard deviation of the
predictions. Cell shading is
scaled to the range 0–0.7
(0.7 is the maximum mean
accuracy per cell displayed).
Olivetti et al.ʼs (2012) test
results [L=LAW][M =
MUSIC]: Partition 1: [[L][M]],
postP: >.99; Partition 2:
[[L,M]], postP: 5 × 10−82.
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performance was Taxonomic classification between Social
Role and Event, where there were a total of 387/700 cor-
rect classifications and the probability of achieving this at
chance is p = .0058 (two-tailed Binomial test). Therefore,
the probability of achieving the remaining stronger results
at chance can be considered highly unlikely.
To test whether taxonomic category or domain could
be more accurately predicted, for each participant, the
mean accuracy per test (mean of the diagonal of each
confusion matrix) was calculated, and the set of means
was analyzed using two-way ANOVA. Main effects were
Target (taxonomic category vs. domain distinction) and
test set (the taxonomic category pair). There was no
significant difference between domain and taxonomic
category, F(1, 252) = 1.07, p = .3; there was however a
significant difference between taxonomic test pair, F(20,
252) = 15.44, p < .001, and a significant interaction,
F(20, 252) = 2.8, p < .001. The significant interaction is
evidence that there are differences in the strength of Taxo-
nomic category/Domain encoding between Taxonomic
category pairs.
The results of post hoc t tests testing for difference
in domain/taxonomic category classification accuracy in
each test set are included in the supplementary materials
for Figure 6. Figure 6 plots the mean ± standard error
number of correct domain/taxonomic predictions per test
over participants. Taxonomic category pairs on the x axis
are sorted in ascending order of the difference between
mean taxonomic category and domain classification ac-
curacy. If differences in Taxonomic category/Domain en-
coding bear any relationship to concreteness, we would
anticipate some distinction between the concreteness of
categories visible in the rankings. It is clear that domains
are more accurately predicted than taxonomic category
in nonconcrete taxonomic category pairings (the left side
of the plot) and that taxonomic distinctions tend to be
relatively more accurate when one of the pair involves
a concrete category. Distinction of domain is greatest
between the two least concrete classes (Attribute and
Urabstract). Distinction of taxonomic category is greatest
between Attribute and Location, followed by the distinc-
tion between Attribute and Tool, then Tool and Location.
The relative difference between classification of taxonomic
category and domain is greatest for the two most concrete
classes (Tool and Location).
To place the above analysis in the context of which taxo-
nomic class pairs showed significant differences between
Domains in concreteness ratings (e.g., pooling all Tool
words and all Attribute words, testing for a significant dif-
ference in concreteness between Domains). Twenty-one
independent samples t tests were computed on each taxo-
nomic category pairing (18 degrees of freedom for each).
Measuring concreteness on a binary scale (see Can taxo-
nomic category-based and domain-based distinctions be
recognized within participants? section), there were sig-
nificant differences between Event and Communication
(t = −2.99, p = .008), Event and Attribute (t = −2.96,
p = .008), Communication and Attribute (t = −2.82,
p = .01). Measuring concreteness on the more inconsis-
tent Likert scale (see Materials section and Discussion sec-
tion), 15/21 comparisons were not significantly different.
All t statistics and associated p values for the Likert scale
Figure 6. Mean ± SE
classification accuracy per
taxonomic test pair averaged
across seven participants.
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tests are in Table 4. All significant differences were ob-
served between pairings of the least concrete classes:
Attribute, Urabstracts, Communication, and Event. There
were, however, no significant differences in concreteness
when these classes were paired with Tool, Location, or
Social Role. In pairings of Attribute, Urabstracts, Com-
munication, and Event with Social Role, Domain was
more strongly classified. Therefore, adopting either con-
creteness measurement scale, differences in concreteness
between Domains could have contributed to their dis-
crimination in a selection of pairings of low concreteness
classes.
In summary, (1) Domain and taxonomic category can
be distinguished for each taxonomic category/domain
combination, (2) Domain is most accurately distinguished
for the least concrete taxonomic categories, and (3) Taxon-
omy category is most accurately distinguished when one
or both categories in the taxonomic pair are concrete/near
concrete.
Can Taxonomic Categories/Domains Be Predicted
across Participants?
To test whether fMRI representations of taxonomic
categories and domains share commonalities across par-
ticipants, a leave-participant-out cross-validation protocol
was adopted. For each participant, all data corresponding
to each taxonomic versus domain subclass were averaged
(e.g., all Music/Tool volumes were averaged across session
and word, and all Law/Tool volumes were averaged like-
wise). As a result, 14 volumes per participant were obtained
(7 taxonomic categories × 2 domain categories); in each of
the seven cross-validation iterations, six participants were
used for training and one for testing. Only voxels cor-
responding to gray matter in all of the spatially normalized
volumes were selected for analysis. In contrast to the pre-
vious sections, selection of the 1000 most stable voxels was
based on a correlation of Taxonomic category × Domain
mean volumes (in the training set) rather than correlation
of words. As there were six participants used in each train-
ing iteration, the 15 rather than 6 correlations (where n =
14 rather than 70) were averaged to give the stability score
for each voxel.
Can Taxonomic Categories Be Predicted
across Participants?
The leave-out-participant taxonomic category confusion
matrix is in Figure 7. Mean classification accuracy was
∼.37, with chance level at .143. The probability of achiev-
ing this result (36/98 correct classifications) at chance is
p = 3.039 × 10−8 (two-tailed Binomial test). Tool and
Location were accurately predicted; the other, less con-
crete, taxonomic categories, however, were conflated. This
observation was supported by Olivetti et al.ʼs test: The
results of the highest ranking five posterior probabilities
are in the caption of Figure 7 (the remaining partitions
are in the supplementary materials for Figure 7).
The highest posterior probability ( p = .1) suggests
that Tool and Location are distinct, and the remaining
five less concrete classes conflate. It should be recognized
that this probability is comparatively low compared with
results in previous sections (previous seven-way classifica-
tion results have had posterior probabilities >.9). This can
be considered in part because of the lower sample size.
We therefore examine also the next four ranking partitions
that have posterior probabilities ranging from .032 to .068.
There is consistency across partitions, Location is distinct
in all five partitions and Tool is distinct in 4/5 partitions
(in the second it forms a subset with Communication).
The third ranking partition maintains Social Role as being
distinct. Collating these results, it is reasonable to assume
that the most concrete classes are distinguishable and the
less concrete classes are confused; however, specifically
which classes conflate is unclear.
Can Domains Be Recognized across Participants?
Mean domain classification accuracy was ∼.7, with
chance level at .5, in the leave-participant-out analyses.
Table 4. Results of Independent t Tests (Two-Tailed, df = 18) Testing for Differences in Concreteness Ratings (Scale [1 7]) between Domains, per Each of the
21 Taxonomic Category Pairs Corresponding to the Classification Analysis in Which Is More Strongly Encoded, Taxonomic Category Distinctions or Domain
Distinctions? Section and Figure 6
Tool Location Social Role Event Communication Attribute
Tool
Location t = −0.69, p = .50
Social Role t = −0.22, p = .83 t = −0.28, p = .78
Event t = −0.95, p = .35 t = −1.08, p = .29 t = −1.32, p = .20
Communication t = −1.30, p = .21 t = −1.45, p = .16 t = −1.73, p = .10 t = −4.60, p = .0002
Attribute t = −0.87, p = .40 t = −0.96, p = .35 t = −1.129, p = .27 t = −3.62, p < .0020 t = −5.89, p < .0001
Urabstract t = −0.67, p = .51 t = −0.74, p = .47 t = −0.85, p = .41 t = −2.68, p = .0152 t = −3.76, p = .0014 t = −3.53, p < .0024
The top left cell corresponds to the difference in Domain between all 10 Tools and all 10 Locations pooled.
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The probability of achieving this result (68/98 correct
classifications) at chance is p = .00015 (two-tailed Bino-
mial test). A confusion matrix of results is in Figure 8, and
the results of Olivetti et al.ʼs (2012) discrimination test
are in the caption, suggesting strongly that Music and
Law can be discriminated (posterior probability > .99).
Classification was however inaccurate for Law/Location
and Music/Event and weak for Law/Tool. In the within-
participant analysis discrimination of Domain from Law/
Tool and Location is low (see Figures 2 and 3). There is
however no obvious prior reason to anticipate such low
prediction from Music/Event.
The Interrelation of Taxonomic Categories
and Domains
Given the variability in the strength of Taxonomic category/
Domain encoding observed between different taxonomic
category pairs in Which is more strongly encoded, taxo-
nomic category distinctions or domain distinctions? sec-
tion and the apparent relationship of this to the degree of
concreteness, we might expect there to be corresponding
differences in the way that representations of Taxonomic
category and Domain are organized. Before the study, we
identified three models of the respective role of taxonomic
categorization and domains in conceptual knowledge.
These models, illustrated in Figure 9, include the following:
(1) Taxonomy within domain: Each domain is indepen-
dently represented, that is, there are spatially distinct regions
in classification space devoted to processing information
regarding each domain. Taxonomic categories pertinent to
each domain are represented within the respective domain
region. (2) Domain within taxonomy: There are spatially
distinct regions in classification space dedicated to process-
ing information regarding different taxonomic categories.
All domain information relevant to a particular taxonomic
category is represented within the respective taxonomic
region (this is in fact how WordNet Domain is organized).
(3) Domain/taxonomy independent: There are spatially
distinct regions in classification space dedicated to pro-
cessing all taxonomic and domain categories. There is no
overlap between representations of domain and taxonomic
class.
The plausibility of each model can be tested by cross-
validation analyses, where entire taxonomic categories/
domains are left out of the training set and used in testing.
The domain within taxonomy model can be tested by
leaving out a domain when training taxonomic classifiers
and using this left out domain for testing. If there is a
region encoding taxonomy common to both Music and
Law, we would expect that a taxonomic classifier trained
on Music words would be able to distinguish unseen
Law/taxonomic category representations and vice versa.
If taxonomic classification is at chance, this suggests that
Music and Law representations of taxonomic categories
are separate.
The taxonomy within domain model can be tested by
leaving out taxonomic categories when training domain
Figure 7. Leave-participant-
out Taxonomic category
classification confusion matrix.
Rows are the target labels
and columns are predictions.
Numbers overlaid on each cell
indicate the proportion of
predictions for Law and Music,
respectively (as indicated on
the right y axis), for that
row, averaging over seven
participants. The numbers
on the bottom line of each
cell are the mean and standard
deviation of predictions. Cell
shading is scaled to the range
0–0.79 (0.79 is the maximum
mean accuracy per cell
displayed). Olivetti et al.ʼs
(2012) test results [T = Tool]
[L = Location][S = Social Role]
[E=Event][C=Communication]
[A = Attribute][U = Urabstracts]:
Partition 1: [[T][L][S,E,C,A,U]],
postP: 0.1; Partition 2: [[T C][L]
[S,E,A,U]], postP: 0.068;
Partition 3: [[T][L][S][E,C,A,U]],
postP: 0.067; Partition 4: [[T][L]
[S,E,A,U][C]], postP: 0.062;
Partition 5: [[T][L][S,E][C,A,U]],
postP: 0.032.
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classifiers and using the left out taxonomic category
for testing. If the domain of the left-out taxonomic cate-
gory cannot be predicted, then information pertinent
to domain classification is not shared with the other
taxonomic categories. For instance, the relationship of
musical instruments to theMusic domain may be encoded
by neural representations pertaining to acoustics and
complex manual motor patterns, which we would not
necessarily expect to be active or relevant for distinguish-
ing Music Location. If organization follows the taxonomy
within domain model, domain classification should be
unaffected by leaving out taxonomic categories. If orga-
nization follows the taxonomy/domain independent
model, then either of the above analyses should not disrupt
classification.
Leave-one-category-out cross-validation analyses were
undertaken on each participant for taxonomic category
and domain classification. In taxonomic categorization,
there were two cross-validation iterations, where either
all Music words or all Law words were left out of the
training set and used in the test set. Training in each itera-
tion was therefore on 175 volumes (five words in seven
taxonomic categories and five replicates per word), and
testing was also on 175 volumes. In each iteration, the
1000 most stable voxels were selected from the mean
correlation of all words in the training set (35), between
each unique session pair (5 sessions; therefore, 10 cor-
relation coefficients were averaged per voxel to give the
stability score).
For domain classification, there were seven cross-
validation iterations, in each of which all words from a
taxonomic class were left out of the training set and used
in testing. In each iteration, training was therefore on
300 volumes (10 words in six taxonomic categories with
five replicates per word), and testing was on 50 words.
For each iteration, the 1000 most stable voxels were
selected using correlations as above, this time based
on 60 words in five sessions, and again 10 correlation
coefficients were averaged.
As the above two analyses use a different number of
volumes in training, comparative to the leave-out-session
analyses in Can taxonomic category-based and domain-
based distinctions be recognized within participants? sec-
tion (leave-Domain-out Taxonomic category classification
is based on 175 volumes in contrast to 280, and leave-
Domain-Taxonomic-category-out classification is based
on 300 rather than 280 volumes), control analyses with
data set sizes matching the above analyses were run.
Words in the control training and test sets were ran-
domly selected but constrained to span all secondary
categories (i.e., in the control for the leave-Taxonomic-
category-out test, five words would be left out of train-
ing, three that were selected randomly would belong
to one domain and the remaining two would be to the
other).
Can the Taxonomic Category of Words from an
Unseen Domain Be Predicted?
Mean classification accuracy for leave-Domain-out Taxo-
nomic category classification was ∼.22, with chance level
Figure 8. Leave-participant-out
Domain classification confusion
matrix. Rows are the target
labels, and columns are
predictions. Numbers overlaid
on each cell indicate the
proportion of predictions
per taxonomic category (as
indicated on the right y axis)
for that row, averaging over
seven participants. The
numbers on the bottom line
of each cell are the mean and
standard deviation of the
predictions. Cell shading is
scaled to the range 0–0.73
(0.73 is the maximum mean
accuracy per cell displayed).
Olivetti et al.ʼs (2012) test
results [L = LAW][M = MUSIC]:
Partition 1: [[L][M]], postP:
>0.99; Partition 2: [[L,M]],
postP: 0.0015.
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at .143. In total there were 534/2450 correct classifica-
tions, and the probability of achieving this by chance is
p ≤ 2.2 × 10−16 (two-tailed Binomial test). A confusion
matrix of results is in Figure 10. Tool and Location
can be seen to be relatively well predicted; however,
the less concrete classes aggregate. The top four rank-
ing partitions from Olivetti et al.ʼs (2012) discrimination
test are in the caption of Figure 10 (the remainder in
the supplementary materials for Figure 10). The top
ranking partition (posterior probability of .67) concurs
with this observation: Tool and Location are distinct,
and all other classes form the same subset. The second
to fourth partitions have posterior probabilities rang-
ing from 0.15 to 0.01. Each partition discriminates
between either three or four subsets of taxonomic
category; however, Tool and Location are always dis-
tinct, and the less concrete classes conflated in certain
combinations.
The comparative control confusion matrix is in Figure 11.
Mean accuracy in the control was ∼.25, there were 606/
2450 correct classifications, and the probability of achiev-
ing this by chance is p ≤ 2.2 × 10−16 (two-tailed Binomial
test). Here there also appears to be some ambiguity
among the less concrete classes (suggesting that the re-
duced training set size comparative to Can taxonomic
category-based and domain-based distinctions be recog-
nized within participants? section impairs classification);
however, Tool, Location, Social Role, and Attribute are
visibly distinct. The four top ranking partitions fromOlivetti
et al. apos;s (2012) analysis are in the caption of Fig-
ure 11 (the remaining partitions are in the supplementary
materials for Figure 11). The top ranking partition (poste-
rior probability = .67) indeed segregates Tool, Location,
Social Role, and Attribute, whereas Event, Communi-
cation, and Urabstracts are aggregated. The following
three partitions have posterior probabilities ranging be-
tween .13 and .03 and allocate categories to five, four,
and six subsets, respectively (with Tool and Location
always distinct and the less concrete classes split into two
to four subsets).
It follows that leaving out an entire domain disrupts
classification of the less concrete categories, which
is consistent with the suggestion that the less concrete
concepts more closely adhere to taxonomic category
within domain organization. However, it should be rec-
ognized that classification accuracy is reduced for six
of the seven taxonomic categories (including Tool and
Location). Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that
domain is a less important organizing principle for the
more concrete experimental concrete concepts; however,
it is not irrelevant.
Can Domain Be Predicted from an Unseen
Taxonomic Category?
In the leave-Taxonomic-category-out classification anal-
ysis, mean accuracy was ∼.7, with chance at .5. There
were 1710/2450 correct classifications, and the probabil-
ity of achieving this by chance is p ≤ 2.2 × 10−16 (two-
tailed Binomial test). Olivetti et al.ʼs (2012) test strongly
supports that Domains can be distinguished (posterior
probability > 0.99). Inspecting Figure 12, it can be seen
that prediction of Domain from Law/Tool is at chance
level. Prediction of Domain from Music/Location is also
weak; however, this was also the case in the original anal-
ysis (Figure 5). This implies that the information neces-
sary to correctly decode Law/Tool as being related to
Law is not contained in the remaining training data. In
contrast, the information necessary to predict the rela-
tion of Tool to Music clearly overlaps the other catego-
ries (presumably the overlap is with the less concrete
categories given the weak prediction of Music from
Location).
Figure 9. Putative models of organization of Domain/Taxonomic
class intersections. Description is in The interrelation of taxonomic
categories and domains section. The dashed lines are intended
to symbolize a fuzzy class boundary with overlap between
neighboring classes.
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The mean accuracy in the control confusion matrix
(Figure 13) was ∼.71, with chance at 0.5. There were
1732/2450 correct classifications, and the probability
of achieving this by chance is p ≤ 2.2 × 10−16 (two-
tailed Binomial test). The results of Olivetti et al.ʼs (2012)
test, listed in the caption of Figure 13, give strong evi-
dence (posterior probability > 0.99) that Domain can be
discriminated. Discrimination of Law/Tool and Music/
Figure 11. Control for
leave-Domain-out Taxonomic
category classification confusion
matrix. Rows are the target
labels, and columns are
predictions. Numbers overlaid
on each cell indicate the
proportion of predictions
per Law and Music, respectively
(as indicated on the right y axis)
for that row, averaging over
seven participants. The numbers
on the bottom line of each cell
are the mean and standard
deviation of predictions. Cell
shading is scaled to the range
0–0.33 (0.33 is the maximum
mean accuracy per cell
displayed). Olivetti et al.ʼs
(2012) test results: [T = Tool]
[L = Location][S = Social Role]
[E=Event][C=Communication]
[A = Attribute][U = Urabstract]:
Partition 1: [[T][L][S][E,C,U]
[A]], postP: 0.77; Partition 2:
[[T][L][S][E][C,A,U]], postP:
0.13; Partition 3: [[T][L][S,E,C,U]
[A]], postP: 0.03; Partition 4:
[[T][L][S][E][C,U][A]],
postP: 0.03.
Figure 10. Leave-Domain-
out Taxonomic category
classification confusion matrix.
Rows are the target labels,
and columns are predictions.
Numbers overlaid on each
cell indicate the proportion of
predictions per Law and Music,
respectively (as indicated on
the right y axis), for that
row, averaging over seven
participants. The numbers on
the bottom line of each cell
are the mean and standard
deviation of predictions. Cell
shading is scaled to the range
0–0.29 (0.29 is the maximum
mean accuracy per cell
displayed). Olivetti et al.ʼs
(2012) test results [T = Tool]
[L = Location][S = Social Role]
[E=Event][C=Communication]
[A = Attribute][U = Urabstract]:
Partition 1: [[T][L][S,E,C,A,U]],
postP: 0.67; Partition 2: [[T][L]
[S,E,A,U][C]], postP: 0.15;
Partition 3: [[T][L][S][E,C,A,U]],
postP: 0.15; Partition 4: [[T][L]
[S,E][C,A,U]], postP: 0.01.
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Location is also observably improved from the leave-
Taxonomic-category-out test (in fact we might expect
better classification than Can taxonomic category-
based and domain-based distinctions be recognized within
participants? section given the greater training set size
here).
In summary: (1) Testing the taxonomic category classi-
fiers on an unseen Domain reduces classification accuracy
per se and disrupts distinction between less concrete
concepts. Taxonomic category within Domain orga-
nization appears more appropriate to describe noncon-
crete concepts. (2) Testing Domain classifiers on unseen
Figure 12. Leave-Taxonomic-
category-out Domain
classification confusion matrix.
Rows are the target labels,
and columns are predictions.
Numbers overlaid on each
cell indicate the proportion
of predictions per taxonomic
category (as indicated on
the right y axis) for that
row, averaging over seven
participants. The numbers
on the bottom line of each
cell are the mean and standard
deviation of the predictions.
Cell shading is scaled to
the range 0–0.7 (0.7 is the
maximum mean accuracy per
cell displayed). Olivetti et al.ʼs
(2012) test results [L = LAW]
[M = MUSIC]: Partition 1:
[[L][M]], postP: >0.99;
Partition 2: [[L,M]], postP:
6.6 × 10−85.
Figure 13. Control for Leave-
Taxonomic-category-out
Domain classification confusion
matrix. Rows are the target
labels, and columns are
predictions. Numbers overlaid
on each cell indicate the
proportion of predictions
per taxonomic category (as
indicated on the right y axis)
for that row, averaging over
seven participants. The numbers
on the bottom line of each cell
are the mean and standard
deviation of the predictions.
Cell shading is scaled to the
range 0–0.71 (0.71 is the
maximum mean accuracy
per cell displayed). Olivetti
et al.ʼs (2012) test results
[L = LAW][M = MUSIC]:
Partition 1: [[L][M]], postP:
1>0.99; Partition 2: [[L,M]],
postP: 4.1 × 10−93.
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taxonomic categories selectively ablates identification of the
relationship between Law/Tool and Law. This suggests
at least for Location that some Domain information is
represented within the Taxonomic category.
Anatomic Regions Discriminating Taxonomic
Categories and Domains
Our major focus thus far has been establishing that the
categories tested are cognitively relevant, we close with
an analysis probing which anatomical regions indepen-
dently support classifications. The taxonomic/domain
classification analyses of Can taxonomic category-based
and domain-based distinctions be recognized within par-
ticipants? section were repeated for each participant on
each of 116 anatomical ROIs, defined by Tzourio-Mazoyer
et al. (2002)ʼs Automated Anatomical Labeling scheme
(e.g., as per Wang et al., 2012). All voxels in each region
contributed to analysis; however, not all 116 areas were de-
tected for each participant. Otherwise the cross-validation
procedure was the same. ROIs for which at least one
Taxonomic category could be discriminated when results
are summed over participants (according to the most
likely hypothesis from Olivetti et al.ʼs, 2012 analysis) are
displayed in Figure 14 and listed in Table 5. Full results
are in the supplementary material for Table 5.
Twelve of the 15 ROIs are located in the left hemi-
sphere as would be expected of a language-related task.
All seven categories could be discriminated from the left
middle occipital gyrus, with an overall accuracy of .25
(.5 less than the whole-brain analysis). Tool, Location,
Social Role, and Attribute can be discriminated from the
left middle temporal gyrus, and three categories (combina-
tions of Tool, Location, Social Role, and Attribute) were
distinguished from the left precuneus and left inferior
and superior parietal regions. More specialized distinctions
for specific concrete categories were located in the left
precentral gyrus (Tools only) and fusiform gyri (Location
only). The left inferior frontal gyrus distinguishes Attributes
and Tools (i.e., arguably the most abstract class, from the
most concrete class, and all other intermediate classes
are conflated), and the neighboring left middle frontal
gyrus distinguishes Attributes from the other categories.
ROIs for which Domains could be discriminated at
a level of .58 or over (all distinguishable according to
Olivetti et al.ʼs, 2012 analysis), are displayed in Figure 15
and listed in Table 6 (full results are in the supplementary
Figure 14. Depiction of within
anatomical region Taxonomic
category classification results
listed in Table 5. AAL regions
are color coded, and categories
that could be discriminated
within each region are overlaid.
The numeric subscript links
regions to Table 5.
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material for Table 6). There are 15 ROIs matching this
criteria (which is the number of areas supporting Taxo-
nomic distinctions), 10 of which are in the left hemisphere.
Best distinction was in the left middle temporal gyrus;
however, relatively good accuracy was also observed in
the right superior and middle temporal gyri, left superior
temporal gyrus, and left precuneus. Notably, the superior
temporal gyri contain the auditory cortex, which may
be relevant to discriminating Music. Absent from the list
in Table 6 is the left middle occipital gyrus, for which
accuracy was .57 (and still statistically supported, see
supplementary material); however, the left angular gyrus
(implicated by Binder et al., 2009, to integrate complex
information) does appear, as also do five areas in the
Table 5. Taxonomic Classification Accuracy within Anatomical Regions, Summed over All Seven Participants (Accuracy Corresponds
to the Diagonal of the Confusion Matrix)
Tool Location
Social
Role Event Communication Attribute Urabstracts
Mean
Accuracy
Mean
# Voxels
Std
# Voxels
Occipital_Mid_L1 108 103 75 73 80 100 71 0.25 428.29 10.21
Temporal_Mid_L2 100 88 90 64 79 92 52 0.23 610.43 56.62
Precuneus_L3 76 113 73 69 71 79 67 0.22 426.57 18.27
Parietal_Inf_L4 98 84 69 73 71 83 47 0.21 297.57 8.34
Parietal_Sup_L5 88 102 72 52 64 77 69 0.21 225.71 11.19
Precuneus_R6 73 100 71 61 62 88 56 0.21 409.43 12.69
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L7 92 62 69 59 78 76 66 0.2 315.14 5.67
Frontal_Mid_L8 77 80 61 47 69 90 60 0.2 603.57 13.9
Fusiform_L9 63 104 78 70 54 55 58 0.2 246.14 51.7
Frontal_Sup_L10 91 61 64 63 60 82 58 0.2 421.86 14.87
Calcarine_L11 76 94 69 57 45 75 57 0.19 310.29 10.05
Temporal_Mid_R12 88 61 64 63 53 77 63 0.19 612.86 16.96
Frontal_Inf_Oper_L13 94 66 63 48 63 71 55 0.19 134.57 2.07
Fusiform_R14 66 90 71 55 60 57 56 0.19 272.86 30.99
Precentral_L15 89 65 52 50 68 74 50 0.18 395.71 14.5
Full results are in the supplementary material for Table 5. Anatomical regions are shown for which at least one category could be discriminated
according to Olivetti et al.ʼs (2012) statistics. Categories that can be distinguished according to the most likely hypothesis arising from Olivetti et al.ʼs
test are highlighted in bold. The two rightmost columns show the mean and standard deviation of the number of voxels per region. The subscripted
numbers by each regionʼs name link to Figure 14, where results are displayed on the cortical surface.
Figure 15. Depiction of within anatomical region Domain category classification results listed in Table 6. AAL regions are color coded, and
the overlay indicates categories where Domain discrimination was possible. The numeric subscript links regions to Table 6, regions where also
Taxonomic categories were distinguishable have a White numeric subscript. Note that the cingulate gyrus is not visible here (see Table 6).
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frontal lobe (again including the left inferior and middle
gyri).
DISCUSSION
Taxonomic Category/Domain Classification
Our primary finding is that both types of conceptual
organization are encoded in fMRI signals. Our evidence
suggests that fMRI recordings contain sufficient informa-
tion to discriminate between all taxonomic categories
tested here: In other words, the distinctions between non-
concrete categories proposed in state-of-the-art models
of conceptual knowledge such as WordNet are supported
to a certain extent by brain data. We found evidence for
domain-based organization, as it was also possible to dis-
criminate between Domains. However, we also observed a
concreteness effect, most clearly demonstrated in the pair-
wise tests of Which is more strongly encoded, taxonomic
category distinctions or domain distinctions? section, where
Domain is most accurately distinguished for the least
concrete classes, whereas taxonomic category is better
distinguished when one or both classes are concrete/
near-concrete.
Subjectivity of Conceptual Representations
A second key finding is that these distinctions have simila-
rities in encoding across participants: in particular, Tool
and Location could be reliably predicted for unseen par-
ticipants. But all other (less concrete) classes aggregated.
This result is in agreement with intuition, in that an indi-
vidualʼs experience of abstract entities is likely to be more
subjective than that of concrete entities, which will tend to
be sensed and interacted with in similar ways. As such,
they are grounded in a shared perceptual reality as many
perceptual and motor processing networks are mapped
in broadly the same way across healthy people. As the
features underlying nonconcrete concepts are not clear,
we cannot assume similar anatomical mappings across
people and for them to be embodied within such expan-
sive areas of cortex as those dedicated to perception and
action. It follows that commonalities in representation
may be found at a smaller volumetric scale than that in-
vestigated here. If the lack of cross-participant shared
representations was to be confirmed also at a smaller scale,
the question would be raised of how people manage to
understand each other when discussing nonconcrete con-
cepts, given the role that common ground plays in commu-
nication (see, e.g., Clark, 1996). But the need for a theory of
communication that does not rely on assuming “perfect” un-
derstanding on the part of the speakers has already been
made abundantly clear by recent psycholinguistic work
suggesting, for example, that speakers only construct “good
enough” representations of each otherʼs sentences (see,
e.g., Ferreira, Ferraro, & Bailey, 2002), although the exact
form such a theory would take is by no means clear (for an
attempt, see, e.g., Poesio & Rieser, 2010).
Table 6. Domain Classification Accuracy within Anatomical Regions, Summed over All 7 Participants
Law Music Mean Accuracy Mean # Voxels SD # Voxels
Temporal_Mid_L2 753 789 0.63 610.43 56.62
Temporal_Sup_R16 739 771 0.62 424.14 12.52
Precuneus_L3 754 750 0.61 426.57 18.27
SupraMarginal_L17 752 744 0.61 152.57 2.88
Temporal_Sup_L18 751 744 0.61 311.71 16.48
Temporal_Mid_R12 749 734 0.61 612.86 16.96
Frontal_Mid_L8 723 733 0.59 603.57 13.90
Parietal_Inf_L8 739 712 0.59 297.57 8.34
Angular_L19 735 704 0.59 151.29 5.25
Cingulum_Post_LNA 703 736 0.59 48.57 2.70
Frontal_Inf_Tri_R21 714 725 0.59 269.57 6.40
Frontal_Sup_L10 729 707 0.59 421.86 14.87
Precuneus_R6 705 727 0.58 409.43 12.69
Frontal_Sup_Medial_L22 701 723 0.58 330.43 11.52
Frontal_Inf_Oper_R23 724 697 0.58 173.43 5.56
Full results are in the supplementary material for Table 6. Following Olivetti et al. (2012), Law and Music can be distinguished in all of the ROIs
displayed. The two rightmost columns show the mean and standard deviation of the number of voxels per region. The subscripted numbers by each
regionʼs name link to Figure 15, where results are displayed on the cortical surface.
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Models of Concept Organization
Three organizational models addressing how joint
Domain/Taxonomic category membership might be
arranged were considered. Again we observed a con-
creteness distinction, in that Domain appears to be a
more important organizational principle for less con-
crete words (it proved difficult to predict the taxonomic
category of nonconcrete words from unseen Domains)
whereas the more concrete categories Tool and Location
could be identified.
Anatomical Regions of Interest
Repeating the taxonomic and domain discrimination on
segmented anatomical ROIs revealed a number of differ-
ent areas supporting classification. Some were generalist
in the sense that it was possible to discriminate all or
most Taxonomic/Domain categories (e.g., left middle
occipital gyrus and left middle temporal gyrus), others
appeared to be more specialized (e.g., left precentral gyrus
discriminating Tools). It is immediately clear that wide-
spread cortical activity supports discrimination, so we are
left with a question over what neural processes our clas-
sifiers were actually discriminating within the different
regions. We suggest that the strongest case of discrimi-
nation, observed in the left middle occipital gyrus, was
exploiting differences in grounded visual representations
activated in mental imagery. This region has previously
been found to discriminate neural activation associated
with mental imagery of different patterns, and these self-
generated representations were shown to be similar to
those observed when patterns were supplied as perceptual
input (Stokes, Thompson, Cusack, & Duncan, 2009;
Stokes, Thompson, Nobre, & Duncan, 2009). Additionally
Anderson, Bruni, Bordignon, Poesio, and Baroni (2013)
have begun to accrue evidence suggesting that concrete
concept elicited neural activity in occipital areas can be
explained by natural image statistics. The precuneus is
believed to be involved in self-centered mental imagery
and episodic memory retrieval (e.g., see Cavanna &
Trimble, 2006), the latter of which would be relevant for
recall of the rehearsed concept simulations. Recent evi-
dence suggests that representation of objects in this area
is at least in part amodal (Fairhall & Caramazza, 2013), so
it may be safer to suggest that the precuneus could assist
in configuring the imaginary-spatial layout of a scenario
reconstructed in perceptual regions rather than being the
site of reconstruction. Areas around the intraparietal sulcus
are commonly implicated to have roles in spatial attention
(e.g., see Gillebert et al., 2011). We consider that atten-
tional processes could be a precursor to mental imagery,1
triggering activity in perceptual systems that are appro-
priate to simulating the concept. This could be seen as
relating to goal-oriented behavior where attention modu-
lates perception to attend to specific target features,
for example, looking for the “horizontal red line” (see
also Stokes, Thompson, Cusack, et al., 2009; Stokes,
Thompson, Nobre, et al., 2009).
Binder et al. (2009) suggest that the left middle tem-
poral gyrus subserves a role in supramodal integration
and processing perceptual information about objects and
their attributes (further evidence coming from Fairhall
& Caramazza, 2013), which is consistent with discrimina-
tion of the more concrete categories Tools, Locations,
and possibly Social Roles. In addition Wang et al. (2010,
2012) and Rodríguez-Ferreiro, Gennari, Davies, and Cuetos
(2011) have connected this area with abstract word pro-
cessing, which is in keeping with the additional discrimi-
nation of Attributes. Discrimination in the left precentral
gyrus (Tools only) is presumably via neurons associated
with motor control. In similar experimental paradigms,
using line drawings as stimuli, the left precentral and fusi-
form gyri, respectively, were associated with “tools” and
“dwellings” (Shinkareva et al., 2008) or using text as stimuli,
“manipulation” and “shelter” (Just et al., 2010). Following
this interpretation, it is perhaps unexpected that the left
angular gyrus, which Binder et al. (2009) suggest has a role
in complex information integration and knowledge re-
trieval only, segregated Domains but not Taxonomic
categories. However, this may be a byproduct of the
relatively meager voxel coverage of this area (mean =
151 voxels) comparative to, for example, the left middle
occipital gyrus (mean = 428 voxels) and the left middle
temporal gyrus (mean = 610 voxels).
Conversely, discrimination in frontal areas is more
likely to be based on more abstract symbolic/ linguistic
semantic information. The inferior frontal gyrus has been
implicated in abstract word processing (e.g., Wang et al.,
2010, 2012; Rodríguez-Ferreiro et al., 2011; Binder et al.,
2009). Here we find that the left inferior frontal gyrus
distinguishes Attributes and Tools. The neighboring left
middle frontal gyrus distinguishes Attributes from the
other categories, and the left superior frontal gyrus dis-
tinguishes Tools. Taken all together, this is a distinction
between arguably the most abstract class and the most
concrete class, and all other intermediate classes are con-
flated. Binder et al. (2009) have suggested the left inferior
gyrus has a role biased toward syntactic processing and is
beneficial but not essential to semantic processing and the
superior frontal gyrus may be responsible for coordinating
knowledge retrieval.
In summary, we tentatively allude to a mechanism
where frontal regions serve goal-directed control, com-
bining with parietal attention processes, to initiate and
configure mental simulations instantiated in perceptual
and motor areas. Amodal representations in the temporal
cortex could be activated in interpreting stimuli words,
generating content for mental simulations (e.g., object
representations), monitoring the imaginary scenario, or
all three.
Particular questions remaining for the future concern
how modal/supramodal representations concerning con-
cepts change within and between anatomical regions
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(see also the discussion in Shinkareva et al., 2008). For
instance, (1) multiple representations of a concept set
organized in the same way could support independent
processing in different neural regions, guard against
damage, and allow easy mapping from one modality to
another; (2) replications of a concept set with different
organizational schemes could facilitate neural queries
by allowing different methods of indexing information
and different ways to combine concepts in planning
(e.g., in a hypothetical visual feature map “snake” and
“belt” could share a similar locus based on appearance,
whereas in a semantic map this would be unlikely, or
of relevance, to this article, we might speculate our con-
cept set is jointly represented according to both Taxon-
omy within Domain and Domain within Taxonomy
structures). Note that Anzellotti, Mahon, Schwarzbach,
and Caramazza (2011) have observed qualitative dif-
ferences in computation between regions; (3) a concept
set may be replicated at multiple-nested spatial scales of
representation (with either similar or different represen-
tations), potentially allowing efficient parallel processing
at different “volumetric” frequency bands.
Concreteness Ratings
One of our goals has been to broaden the range of non-
concrete concepts investigated and move beyond the
concrete/abstract dichotomy. The inconsistencies we ob-
served in peoplesʼ concreteness ratings (Materials section)
raise doubts about the value of rating concepts on a
concrete–abstract continuum. On the flipside, through
demonstrating systematic subdivisions of nonconcrete
concepts exist, our results warn against lumping all ab-
stract concepts together as a superclass, which risks con-
cealing meaningful class divisions. The implications of
our results are to encourage consideration of how dif-
ferent semantic categorization schemes may be exploited
to elucidate neural organization (e.g., with our classes,
in behavioral experiments, we might anticipate within
taxonomic/domain class processing advantages). The ex-
perimental value of concreteness ratings has also recently
come under criticism also from Connell and Lynott (2012).
They collected perceptual strength norms in sound, taste,
touch, smell, and vision (e.g., Lynott & Connell, 2009)
and demonstrated that strength in the dominant modality
had more explanatory value than concreteness in behav-
ioral tests traditionally used to demonstrate concreteness
effects. Additionally, Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews,
and Del Campo (2011) have argued that the emotional
content of words (abstract words tend to be more
valenced) plays an important role in explaining such be-
havioral differences. In future work, it may prove interest-
ing to relate our class divisions to multimodal perceptual
norms and also valence norms and to examine whether
these can describe different organization of concepts
between anatomical regions that we have conjectured
earlier this section.
Scenario-based Conceptual Organization
Through basing our experiment on mentally simulating
situations, the success of our results provide support
for theories considering concepts to be grounded in
situations (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). These
theories expect concrete concepts to be linked to rela-
tively narrow range of situations than abstract concepts,
and as such might predict them to be more discrimin-
able, and indeed there was some evidence of this. It also
follows that abstract concept representation might be
more variable. On testing for a relationship between
variability in concept representation and concreteness,
there was found to be no correlation.2 However, this also
could be a byproduct of our experimental design, where
participants rehearsed mental simulations in advance,
or differences could have been invisible to fMRI, for
example, hidden by the low sampling rate.
Reprint requests should be sent to Andrew Anderson, Centro
Interdipartimentale Mente/Cervello, University of Trento, Palazzo
Fedrigotti, Corso Bettini 31, 38068 Rovereto, Italy, or via e-mail:
andrew.anderson@unitn.it.
Notes
1. We know of no reason to expect confounds associated with
perceptual characteristics of the stimulus words to have driven
discrimination (only Urabstracts, which were quite difficult to dis-
criminate, are separable in this respect; see Materials section).
2. For each participant, voxels that contributed to at least 3/5
cross-validation iterations were selected, and the voxelwise stan-
dard deviation was estimated over the five replicates of the word.
The mean standard deviation over participants was taken per
word, and results were correlated with the concreteness rat-
ings from the norms. Pearsonʼs correlation revealed a weak
correlation that was not significant (r = .2, p = .08, n = 70).
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